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In the Chinese securities market, with its characteristics of inﬂuence through
personal relationships (Guanxi) and underdeveloped standards of law and
enforcement, can independent directors play the supervisory role expected
by securities regulators? In this study we use the degree of precision and accu-
racy in corporate earnings forecasts as proxies for the quality of information
disclosure by listed companies and examine the supervisory eﬃciency of inde-
pendent directors with respect to information disclosure. Using data from 2007
to 2009, we ﬁnd that in the absence of ownership balance, independent direc-
tors have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the accuracy of management forecasts.
In addition, the personal backgrounds of independent directors have speciﬁc
eﬀects on management earnings forecasts. Directors with certiﬁed public
accountant (CPA) expertise signiﬁcantly improve the precision of management
forecasts. However, directors with industrial expertise signiﬁcantly reduce the
precision of management forecasts. In other words, having directors with CPA
expertise improves the independence of boards, but having independent direc-
tors with industrial expertise has the opposite eﬀect.
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The absence of ownership balance and the popularity of a single large shareholder are the most commonly
mentioned causes of malpractice in Chinese share markets. Therefore, investors have for many years been call-
ing for boards of directors with greater independence. In 2002, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) moved to improve the corporate governance structures of Chinese listed companies by issuing The
Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of Systems of Independent Directors (hereafter referred to as the Guiding
Opinions). Thereafter, the eﬃciency of independent directors became one of the most widely studied ﬁelds in
the Chinese capital market. There are many extant studies on the relationship between independent directors
and ﬁrm performance, which generally agree that supervision is the most important responsibility of indepen-
dent directors (Ye et al., 2007; Wang, 2007a; Zhao et al., 2008). Recently, Wang et al. (2008) argue that the
improvement in listed companies’ levels of disclosure and transparency serves both to curb the dominance of
large shareholders and to provide a basis for the appraisal of independent directors’ supervisory eﬃciency.
In testing this theory, the main question that previous studies confront is how to measure the level of infor-
mation disclosure in listed companies. The easiest and most accepted way is to use the rating scores given by
independent institutions.1 In China, however, only companies listed on the Shenzhen Securities Exchange
(hereafter referred to as the SZE) are rated annually and those on the Shanghai Securities Exchange are
not. The sample of rated companies is therefore limited, which raises diﬃculties for using rating scores as a
proxy for the level of information disclosure. Because of this diﬃculty, previous studies have usually used vari-
ables such as earnings quality to proxy for the level of information disclosure. The measurement of earnings
quality requires the use of statistical models and the derived variables may not be signiﬁcantly related to the
quality of information disclosure. For example, among the three variables used by Hu and Tang (2008), only
the degree of earnings aggressiveness is signiﬁcantly related to the rating scores given by the SZE and the
degree of earnings management or earnings smoothness are not.
Another way tomeasure the level of information disclosure is to study the quality of one speciﬁc aspect of cor-
porate reporting. The assumption here is that a measure of disclosure quality produced by examining any one
aspect of corporate reporting could proxy for the general level of disclosure provided by a ﬁrm (Botosan,
1997). This assumption was tested and conﬁrmed by Lang and Lundholm (1996), who document a signiﬁcant
rank-order correlation between annual report and other publication disclosure rankings, compared with the cor-
relation between annual report and investor relations disclosure rankings. Building on this approach, Botosan
(1997) used the degree of voluntary information disclosure found in a ﬁrm’s annual report alone to serve as a
proxy for the degree of disclosure provided by a ﬁrmacross all avenues and created a transparency scoring system
called theDSCORE. Li (2008) scored companies based on the readability of annual reports. Other studies (Gra-
hamet al., 2005;Wang, 2007b) have used the attributes ofmanagement earnings forecasts to proxy for the general
level of disclosure. For Chinese listed companies, Bai (2009) ﬁnd that the precision and the accuracy of manage-
ment forecasts are signiﬁcantly related to the transparency rating scores given by the SZE. In line with this
approach, we choose the precision and accuracy of management forecasts to proxy for the general level of dis-
closure and use this measure to study the supervisory eﬃciency of independent directors.
We choose the quality of management forecasts to proxy for the general level of corporate disclosure for
three reasons. First, management forecasting is an important aspect of corporate disclosure that has a signif-
icant inﬂuence on investors and ﬁnancial analysts (Bai, 2009; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Numerous studies have
used the quality of management forecasts to proxy for the level of information disclosure, such as Graham
et al. (2005) and Wang (2007b).2 Second, there is considerable scope for manipulation in management fore-
casting. Studies on voluntary management forecasts have found that management can manipulate the timing,
precision and accuracy of management forecasts (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Rogers and Stocken, 2005).1 For example, studies on American ﬁrms (Sengupta, 1998; Lang and Lundholm, 1996, etc.) usually use the rating scores provided by
FAF (the Report of the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee) and its successor AIMR (The Association for
Investment Management and Research, which changed its name to The CFA Institute in 2004).
2 Beyer et al. (2010) ﬁnd that for the average ﬁrm, 28.37% of the variance in quarterly stock returns occurred on days when accounting
disclosures (including earnings announcements, earnings pre-announcements, management forecasts, analyst forecasts or other SEC-form
ﬁlings) are made. Surprisingly, management forecasts provided, on average, approximately 55% of accounting-based information (pp.
299–300).
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ing of disclosures. However, there are no speciﬁcations concerning the precision and accuracy of management
forecasts and this deﬁciency provides management with many opportunities to manipulate forecasts.3 This
variability in forecasting standards provides us with a good opportunity to examine the supervisory eﬃciency
of independent directors.4 Third, it is very easy to measure the quality of management forecasts in hindsight,
without the use of sophisticated statistical models.
Our study makes two main contributions. First, we use an easily measureable proxy for the general level of
corporate disclosure to examine the supervisory eﬃciency of independent directors in companies with varied
ownership structures. The results are complementary to those found by previous studies, such as Wang et al.
(2008), and also provide insights into the inﬂuence that independent directors have on improving transpar-
ency. Second, we examine the factors inﬂuencing mandatory management forecasts and compare them with
factors inﬂuencing voluntary management forecasts. This comparison provides relatively solid support for
the improvement of regulations on management forecasts in China.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional background and
reviews the related literature. Section 3 develops our research hypothesis and provides variable deﬁnitions.
Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 concludes the study.2. Institutional background and literature review
2.1. Institutional background
Requirements for management forecasts by companies listed on the Chinese stock markets began in 1998.
Song and Ji (2012) provide a detailed description of the related institutional background, explaining that listed
companies have to make management forecasts if their annual earnings are expected to exceed a certain
threshold (henceforth, “the threshold”). This requirement makes management forecasts mandatory rather
than voluntary when the expected earnings exceed the threshold—a unique characteristic not found in more
developed capital markets. Bai (2009) ﬁnds that the information disclosure ratings given by the Shenzhen
Securities Exchange have a signiﬁcant positive relationship with the precision and accuracy of contemporary
annual management forecasts.5 Therefore, Bai concludes that the quality of management forecasting is a good
proxy for the overall quality of information disclosure by listed ﬁrms.
Management forecasts provide signiﬁcant corporate information content. For example, Luo and Song
(2012) ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant market reactions to management forecasts. Bai (2007) and Xue (2001)
arrive at similar conclusions. In summary, there are signiﬁcant positive (or negative) abnormal market returns
from management forecasts announcing good (or bad) news.
Listed companies who have made wrong or misleading management forecasts are likely to be publicly crit-
icized by securities regulators. However, Song and Ji (2012) ﬁnd that the application of penalties is selective in
that most punishments for fraudulent forecasts go to ﬁrms with poor economic performance. Luo and Song
(2012) ﬁnd that, other things being equal, ﬁrms that have made inaccurate management forecasts in prior
years receive a lower market reaction to their current forecasts. These researchers conclude that wrong or mis-3 According to the listing rules, “Listed companies should ensure that there is no material diﬀerence between the ﬁnancial data reported
in earnings pre-announcements and the actual data reported in periodic reports. If the diﬀerence is more than 20 percent, the listing ﬁrm
should apologize in the form of a board note when disclosing the corresponding periodic report. In the meantime, the board must explain
the reason for the diﬀerence and the responsibilities of internal personnel”. However, earnings pre-announcements are diﬀerent from
management forecasts.
4 In some cases owner managers might fail to communicate their forecasts to independent directors before disclosing them to the public.
However, independent directors can still aﬀect the quality of management forecasts in two ways. First, about 50% of annual management
forecasts are announced in third-quarter reports, which must be conﬁrmed by independent directors. Second, as Ajinkya et al. (2005)
argue, independent directors might not directly inﬂuence management forecasts disclosed apart from periodic reports, but these directors
can still indirectly inﬂuence management forecasts by fostering an environment that encourages greater transparency.
5 We conduct a similar correlation analysis for the 2002–2009 period. The results indicate that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation
coeﬃcient between the information disclosure ratings and the precision of management forecasts is 0.1508 (0.1251) and the corresponding
correlation between the information disclosure ratings and management forecast error is 0.1788 (0.1484), all signiﬁcant at the level of
1%.
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of subsequent forecasts, as also concluded by Williams (1996).2.2. Literature review
2.2.1. Precision and accuracy of management forecasts
Management forecasts take four forms: general impressions, open-interval estimates, closed-interval esti-
mates and point estimates. General impression forecasts are the least precise and point estimate forecasts
the most precise. Theoretical analysis (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991, for example) and psychological studies
(Rapoport et al., 1990, for example) both indicate that the precision of information directly inﬂuences the
receiver’s acceptance of the signal’s information content. Usually, higher precision information indicates that
the sender has greater certainty concerning the signal and the receiver responds by giving greater weight to the
signal. Concerning the precision of management forecasts, Baginski et al. (1993) ﬁnd that price reactions to
management forecasts are inﬂuenced by the precision of management forecasts. Speciﬁcally, the price reac-
tions to point estimates are larger than reactions to range estimates. Although Pownall et al. (1993) ﬁnd no
relationship between price reactions and management forecast precision, the experimental results of Hirst
et al. (1999) provide one explanation for this exception to the rule. These researchers ﬁnd that only when
the accuracy of prior management forecasts has been high can investors seriously consider the precision of
current management forecasts. If prior management forecasts have been inaccurate, the current management
forecast (however accurate it is) has no eﬀect on investors’ judgments.
Inaccurate management forecasts can not only mislead market participants (Bai, 2009; Hassell and Jen-
nings, 1986), but also harm the forecaster’s reputation for accurate disclosure (Luo and Song, 2012). In
extreme situations, inaccurate management forecasts might incur litigation (Skinner, 1994) or enforcement
actions (Song and Ji, 2012). Hirst et al. (1999), Hutton and Stocken (2007) and Luo and Song (2012) all ﬁnd
that the accuracy of prior management forecasts directly aﬀects investors’ belief in the credibility of current
forecasts. Bai (2009) ﬁnds that analyst forecasts are directly aﬀected by the precision and accuracy of contem-
porary management forecasts. Williams (1996) and Song (2012) both ﬁnd that analyst forecast revisions are
aﬀected not only by the deviation between management forecasts and analyst forecasts, but also by the accu-
racy of prior management forecasts.2.2.2. Independence of boards and the quality of information disclosure
The quality of information disclosure is an attribute that is hard to measure. Therefore, studies on Chinese
capital markets use various other proxies to examine the supervisory eﬃciency of independent directors and
these studies have mixed results. Hu and Tang (2008) use the quality of earnings to proxy for the quality of
information disclosure.6 They ﬁnd that independent directors signiﬁcantly improve the quality of information
disclosure, with the measure of earnings management an exception to this pattern. Yang and Yang (2006) use
the frequency of restatements as a proxy for the quality of disclosure. They ﬁnd that a board’s percentage of
independent directors has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the likelihood of restatements. Wang (2007a) also ﬁnds
no signiﬁcant relationship between the quality of disclosure (measured by the extent of earnings management)
and the percentage of independent directors on the board. Zhi and Tong (2005) ﬁnd that the frequency and
percentage of changes in independent directors is positively related to the extent of earnings management.
These authors argue that independent directors have expertise, but are not suﬃciently independent, and this
is the key reason why independent directors have not played eﬀective roles in corporate governance. This argu-
ment was conﬁrmed by the results of Zhao et al. (2008), who employ the degree of accounting conservatism to
proxy for the quality of disclosure. These researchers ﬁnd that independent directors have a signiﬁcant positive
inﬂuence on accounting conservatism and that this inﬂuence is stronger for ﬁrms with better corporate gov-
ernance. However, Wang et al. (2008) ﬁnd that even in companies with lower ownership balance (and there-
fore worse corporate governance), the supervisory eﬃciency of independent directors was signiﬁcant, which is6 Hu and Tang (2008) employ four variables to measures the quality of earnings. These variables are the extent of earnings management,
the information disclosure ratings given by the Shenzhen Securities Exchange, the degree of earnings aggressiveness and the degree of
earnings smoothness.
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ments and designs of these studies.7 However, the models used in both the Wang et al. (2008) and Zhao et al.
(2008) studies are derived from the famous Basu model and their sample periods are both from 2002 to 2004.
Studies on developed markets have also used the degree of earnings management (for example, Klein, 2002;
Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005) or the degree of accounting conservatism (for example, Beekes
et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007) to examine independent directors’ inﬂuence on the quality of infor-
mation disclosure. These studies have arrived at relatively consistent conclusions that independent directors
signiﬁcantly increase the degree of accounting conservatism and decrease the degree of earnings management.
At the same time, studies on developed markets have directly examined the relationship between the indepen-
dence of boards and the quality of management forecasts. The results of these studies have been mixed. For
example, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) ﬁnd that the precision of management forecasts is higher for ﬁrms
with a higher percentage of independent directors, but Ajinkya et al. (2005) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence.8 Ajin-
kya et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the optimistic bias is smaller for ﬁrms with a higher percentage of independent direc-
tors, but Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence. Of course there are also some consistent
results. For example, both Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Ajinkya et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the accuracy of
management forecasts is positively related to the percentage of independent directors.2.2.3. Independent directors’ expertise and the quality of information disclosure
Xie et al. (2003) use current abnormal accruals to measure the quality of information disclosure and exam-
ine the relationship between independent directors’ expertise and the quality of disclosure. These authors ﬁnd
that independent directors with ﬁnancial expertise or legal expertise have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on current
abnormal accruals, but directors with corporate governance expertise can signiﬁcantly decrease the level of
current abnormal accruals. This ﬁnding is consistent with the results of Bedard et al. (2004). However, Abbott
et al. (2004) ﬁnd that having at least one ﬁnancial expert on the audit committee signiﬁcantly decreases the
probability of ﬁnancial restatements. Wang et al. (2008) also argue that independent directors with ﬁnancial
backgrounds can help to detect fraudulent reports and improve the credibility of ﬁnancial reports. These
authors also point out that independent directors with legal backgrounds can help control management irreg-
ularities and decrease litigation risks with regard to information disclosure. Wang et al. (2008) also suggest
that independent directors may exert greater supervisory eﬀort to ensure the ﬁrm maintains a good reputation.2.2.4. Other factors inﬂuencing the precision and accuracy of management forecasts
Studies on factors inﬂuencing the precision of management forecasts are less numerous than those on the
accuracy of management forecasts. Baginski and Hassell (1997) ﬁnd that the precision of management fore-
casts is positively related to analyst following and negatively related to both ﬁrm size and earnings volatility.
Baginski et al. (2002) ﬁnd that the precision of management forecasts issued by Canadian ﬁrms is higher than
that of their counterparts in the USA because the litigation risks in Canada are lower than in the USA. Bagin-
ski and Hassell (1997) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) both ﬁnd that the precision in reporting bad news is
signiﬁcantly lower than in reporting good news, because managers wish to avoid dampening the market. Hri-
bar and Yang (2006) ﬁnd that over-conﬁdent managers are more likely to make management forecasts of
higher precision.
There is a wealth of studies on the accuracy of management forecasts. The factors examined in these studies
include corporate governance structures, ﬁrm size, earnings volatility, timing of disclosure, and other factors.
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) ﬁnd that the size of boards has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the accuracy of man-
agement forecasts, but larger board size does decrease the likelihood of optimistically biased forecasts. John-
son et al. (2001) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relationship between ﬁrm size and the accuracy of management
forecasts, but Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Hribar and Yang (2006) ﬁnd no such signiﬁcant relationship. Waymire7 Wang et al. (2008) use a pooled sample with 3046 ﬁrm-year observations and employ the ratio of the shares held by the single largest
shareholder to the sum of shares held by the second to ﬁfth largest shareholders as a proxy for the degree of ownership balance. Zhao et al.
(2008) use a panel sample with 2979 ﬁrm-year observations to obtain an index of corporate governance through factor analysis.
8 Ajinkya et al. (2005) attribute this result to the directors’ fear of greater litigation exposure that might result from more speciﬁc
forecasts.
118 Y. Song et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 113–132(1986) reports no signiﬁcant relationship between earnings volatility and the accuracy of management fore-
casts, but Ajinkya et al. (2005) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relationship. Johnson et al. (2001), Ajinkya et al.
(2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) all ﬁnd that the time gap between the forecast day and the ﬁscal
year end is negatively related to the accuracy of management forecasts.9
3. Research hypothesis and variable deﬁnitions
3.1. Research hypothesis
Studies on voluntary management forecasts usually assume that if managers seek to maximize company
value for shareholders, they should make management forecasts more frequently, more precisely and more
accurately (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Williams, 1996). However, managers can also manipulate
management forecasts for their own interests. Independent directors from outside the company can mitigate
managerial self-interest and inﬂuence the issuance and content quality of earnings forecasts by directly review-
ing the disclosure policies and earnings releases, as well as by fostering an environment that encourages greater
transparency. However, outside directors may also be ineﬀective, either because they are appointed by, or have
allegiance to company managers, or because their board culture discourages conﬂict. The eﬀectiveness of out-
side directors and the extent to which they represent shareholder interests could also be inﬂuenced by the fear
of litigation and reputation costs (Ajinkya et al., 2005, pp. 348–349).
Although the results of studies on independent directors’ supervisory roles are mixed, securities regulators
expect that independent directors play important supervisory roles and improve the general level of corporate
disclosure. Thus our research hypothesis is as follows.
H1: The percentage of independent directors is positively related to the quality of management forecasts.
The corporate governance environment should inﬂuence the supervisory roles of independent directors. On
one hand, a good corporate governance environment will probably strengthen the supervisory eﬃciency of
independent directors (Zhao et al., 2008). On the other hand, a bad corporate governance environment will
probably induce a lower quality of corporate disclosure (Wang et al., 2008), thereby causing a higher risk
of fraudulent behavior. In a poor governance environment, independent directors might also try to reduce
their own personal risk. Therefore, our two sub-hypotheses are as follows.
H1a: In the case of lower company ownership balance, the percentage of independent directors is positively
related to the quality of management forecasts.
H1b: In the case of higher company ownership balance, the percentage of independent directors is posi-
tively related to the quality of management forecasts.
For this analysis we categorize ownership balance by using a z-score, which is equal to the shares held by
the largest shareholder divided by the sum of shares held by the second- to ﬁfth-largest shareholders. If the
z-score is no higher than the industry median of the same year, we allocate it to the higher ownership balance
group. Otherwise, we allocate it to the lower ownership balance group.
3.2. Variable deﬁnitions
Table 1 provides the deﬁnitions of variables used in our analysis. The dependent variables include PRECI-
SION, BIAS and FE.9 In most of the world, voluntary management forecasts usually occur before the end of the ﬁscal year, but this is not necessarily true in
China. Chinese listed companies’ management forecasts can occur either in October, which is before the end of ﬁscal year, or in January,
which is within one month after the end of the ﬁscal year. If we choose only observations occurring before the end of ﬁscal year, the sample
size would be dramatically smaller.
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degree of precision. These are forecasts based on (i) general impression estimates, (ii) open-interval estimates,
(iii) closed-interval estimates and (iv) point estimates. As the ﬁrst type of estimate is the least precise and the last
type the most precise, we assign general impression estimates a value of 0, open-interval estimates a value of 1,
closed-interval estimates a value of 2 and point estimates a value of 3, so that the variable PRECISION has a
value between 0 and 3. BIAS is used to examine whether independent directors can systematically decrease opti-
mistic bias inmanagement forecasts andFEmeasures the accuracy ofmanagement forecasts. The calculations of
accuracy of forecasts of net income are based on the type of forecast used in each observation, with the number of
points used in point estimates, themean in closed-interval estimates and the lower end in open-interval estimates.
The independent variables include the independence of the board (OUT) and proxies for independent direc-
tors’ characteristics, such as their ﬁnancial expertise (CPA), legal expertise (LAW), industrial expertise
(HY_EXP), expertise in corporate governance (GOV_EXP), their reputation as reﬂected in membership of
other boards (REPUT) and their compensation (COMPEN).
The Guiding Opinions specify that “at least one of the independent directors should be a professional
accountant (the term ‘professional accountant’ meaning a person with a senior title or qualiﬁcations as a cer-
tiﬁed public accountant)”. According to this speciﬁcation, every listed company should have at least one pro-
fessional accountant as an independent director. Therefore, having at least one professional accountant is an
almost homogeneous condition across all listed companies. However, having a certiﬁed public accountant
(CPA) on the board is more exceptional and we have tried to detect if such accounting expertise has a mea-
surable eﬀect on the accuracy of management forecasts (Wang et al., 2008).
Concerning other types of director expertise, the Guiding Opinions allow listed companies greater choice in
selecting independent directors with relevant professional backgrounds. Therefore, the number of independent
directors with legal backgrounds, industrial expertise or expertise in corporate governance vary across com-
panies. This variation provides us with opportunities to examine the eﬀects of independent directors with these
diﬀerent kinds of expertise on their companies’ management styles.
Concerning professional reputation, we could expect that independent directors who stand on a greater
number of company boards should have higher supervisory eﬃciency. However, in terms of eﬃcient working
time, the more boards that an independent director serves on, the less time that director can allocate to eachTable 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
BIAS Forecast net income – actual net income/total assets, winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles by year
COMPEN Equals one if the mean compensation of independent directors is higher than the median of the industry and zero
otherwise
CPA Equals one if the company has at least one independent director with a CPA background and zero otherwise
EV Equals the standard deviation of net income in the past 3 years divided by their absolute mean, winsorized at 95th
percentile by year
FE Equals |BIAS|
GOV_EXP Equals one if the company has at least one independent director who is also a manager of other companies and zero
otherwise
HY_EXP Equals one if the company has at least one independent director with an industrial background and zero otherwise
IND Industry dummies
LAW Equals one if the company has at least one independent director with a legal background and zero otherwise
MONTH Equals one if the company’s forecasts are made before the end of ﬁscal year, two if the forecasts are made within one
month after the end of ﬁscal year and three if the forecasts are made between February and April
OUT The percentage of independent directors on the board
PRECISION Rated on a scale of zero to three, with zero for general impression estimates, one for open-interval estimates, two for
closed-interval estimates and three for point estimates
REPUT The mean number of companies in which the independent directors serve as board members
ROA Equals net income of current year/total assets, winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles by year
SIZE Natural log of total assets
ST Equals one if the company is in the state of special treatment and zero otherwise
UE Net income of current year – net income of last year/total assets, winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile by year
YEAR Dummy variables to control for the years 2008 and 2009
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from the variable REPUT.
The inﬂuence of compensation on independent directors is double-edged. Higher compensation could impel
independent directors to play more active roles. However, higher compensation might also induce lower ﬁdu-
ciary eﬀort, in that directors may be so dependent on their compensation that they are reluctant to challenge
the company’s primary owners.
The control variables for our study are deﬁned according to extant literature on voluntary management
forecasts. The variable EV measures the volatility of earnings. Studies on voluntary management forecasts
have found that the precision of management forecasts are negatively related to the volatility of earnings.
The variable UE measures unexpected earnings, or income not anticipated by management. Johnson et al.
(2001) and Ajinkya et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the accuracy of management forecasts is negatively related to the
magnitude of unexpected earnings. Eames and Glover (2003) argue that it is necessary to control for the level
of earnings in analyzing forecasting errors, so we include ROA to control for this eﬀect.10 Koch (2002) ﬁnds
that companies in ﬁnancial distress are more likely to issue wrong or misleading management forecasts. To
account for this we use the variable ST instead of the Ohlson score to proxy for ﬁnancial distress in the Chi-
nese business environment. The variable MONTH controls for the timing of management forecasts. When
management forecasts are disclosed later in the ﬁnancial year, management has more information for earnings
forecasts and therefore produces management forecasts with higher precision and accuracy. The variable
SIZE is used to control for the inﬂuence of ﬁrm size. In addition, the quality of management forecasts might
vary across years and between industries. We include YEAR and IND dummies to control for these eﬀects.
3.3. Regression models
Because PRECISION is an ordinal variable, we run ordered logit regressions of Model (1). As BIAS and
FE are continuous variables, we run OLS (ordinary least squares) regressions of Models (2) and (3),
respectively.10 Re
the rep
study
estima
we usePRECISION ¼ a0 þ a1OUTþ a2CPAþ a3LAWþ a4HY EXPþ a5GOV EPXþ a6REPUT
þ a7COMPENþ a8EVþ a9ROAþ a10STþ a11MONTHþ a12SIZEþ YEARþ INDþ e ð1Þ
BIAS ¼ b0 þ b1OUTþ b2CPAþ b3LAWþ b4HY EXPþ b5GOV EPXþ b6REPUT þ b7COMPEN
þ b8UEþ b9ROAþ b10STþ b11MONTHþ b12SIZEþ YEAR þ INDþ g ð2Þ
FE ¼ c0 þ c1OUTþ c2CPAþ c3LAWþ c4HY EXPþ c5GOV EPXþ c6REPUT þ c7COMPENþ c8UE
þ c9ROAþ c10STþ c11MONTH þ c12SIZEþ YEARþ INDþ l ð3Þ4. Empirical results
4.1. Sample description
Our sample includes annual management forecasts issued by China’s A-share companies during the 2007–
2009 period. To obtain our ﬁnal sample, we ﬁrst remove observations from ﬁnancial industries. Second, we
omit observations in which the types of forecasts issued are “uncertain” or “continuous proﬁt”. Third, we
remove observations without suﬃcient data for analysis. Finally, we have 2621 (2225) suitable observations
with which to examine the precision (accuracy) of management forecasts.sults concerning voluntary management forecasts indicate that the precision and accuracy of good news forecasts are higher when
orts are voluntary. We also deﬁne the variable NEWS with a value of one for good news and zero for bad news. The results of our
indicate that NEWS is positively related to ROA. However, when we add NEWS and ROA simultaneously in the regressions, the
ted coeﬃcients of NEWS are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and those of ROA are still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus,
only ROA in our regressions to control for the level of earnings and the nature of news.
Table 2
Summary of sample.
All Quantitative estimatesa Optimistically biasedb
A: Year distribution
2007 792 666 (84.1%) 85 (12.8%)
2008 871 751 (86.2%) 285 (37.9%)
2009 958 808 (84.3%) 197 (24.4%)
2621 2225 (84.9%) 567 (25.5%)
B: Timing of management forecasts
Before the end of ﬁscal year 1050 858 (81.7%) 201 (23.4%)
January, next year 1379 1195 (86.7%) 326 (27.3%)
February 52 48 (92.3%) 6 (12.5%)
March 52 45 (86.5%) 14 (31.1%)
April 88 79 (89.8%) 20 (25.3%)
2621 2225 (84.9%) 567 (25.5%)
a Quantitative estimates include open-interval, closed-interval and point estimates. Open-interval estimates only forecast a lower end of
the performance, closed-interval estimates forecast the minimum and maximum of the performance, and point estimates forecast a precise
number. There is no number with regard to performance in general impression estimates.
b Refers to overestimated observations among the quantitative estimates. First, we deﬁne MFD as (forecast net income – actual net
income)/absolute value of actual net income. If MFD > 10%, then the observation is overestimated (or optimistically biased) and if
MFD < 10% then the observation is under-estimated (or pessimistically biased).
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Fig. 1a. Forecast precision by year.
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Fig. 1b. Forecast accuracy by year.
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Fig. 2a. Forecast precision and forecast time.
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Fig. 2b. Forecast accuracy and forecast time.
122 Y. Song et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 113–132Table 2 reports the distribution of our sample and Figs. 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b depict the percentage diﬀerences
between factors. Qualitative observations make up less than 15% of our total sample. Concerning the accuracy
of management forecasts, nearly 50% of the observations in 2007 are under-estimated, which might relate to
the application of new accounting standards and the volatility of ﬁnancial markets. In 2008, the percentage of
overestimated forecasts is about 38%, which is considerably greater than in 2007 or 2009. This change may be
a result of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. In 2009, the percentage of accurate forecasts (or forecasts that were
less than 10% diﬀerent from actual results) rose to 48%, which is a higher level of accuracy than in the previous
2 years. Also, management forecasts made in January show slightly higher precision than forecasts made
before the end of ﬁscal year. However, management forecasts made between February and April have higher
forecast accuracy than those made near the end of the ﬁscal year.
4.2. Descriptive analysis
The details concerning independent directors are summarized in Table 3. The results are consistent with
extant literature in showing that the percentage of independent directors required by most listed companies
is generally around 33% of board members. Where the percentage of independent directors is slightly above
33%, it is usually just because board size is not a multiple of three.11 Fig. 3a indicates that boards whose per-
centage of independent directors is more than 40% are more likely to make forecasts using range or point11 When the size of the board is less than nine and the number of independent directors has to be no less than three as regulated, the
percentage of independent directors must be more than one third. To test the inﬂuence of board size, we re-run the regressions with an
additional dummy BDUM (equals one if the size of the board is nine and zero otherwise). The unreported results were unaﬀected.
Table 3
Summary of independent directors.
Precision of management forecasts equals Accuracy of management forecastsa
0 1 2 3 Over Accurate Under
A: Percentage of independent directors on the board
<1/3 13 15 25 26 26 25 15
=1/3 215 295 581 333 284 518 407
(1/3%,40%] 99 128 272 161 149 235 177
(40%,50%] 65 70 179 113 101 172 89
>50% 4 9 10 8 7 15 5
Ratio test v2 = 10.78 v2 = 21.54***
B: Number of independent directors who are CPAs
0 307 401 580 413 357 579 458
1 82 106 457 213 197 359 220
2 6 10 29 15 13 27 14
P3 1 1 1
Ratio test v2 = 119.91*** v2 = 9.12
C: Number of independent directors with legal backgrounds
0 209 287 566 340 314 518 361
1 152 199 454 260 216 393 304
2 32 25 43 41 33 49 27
P3 3 6 4 4 5 1
Ratio test v2 = 21.68*** v2 = 8.03
D: Number of independent directors with industrial backgrounds
0 244 267 548 448 312 535 416
1 125 196 390 150 201 327 208
2 25 43 118 39 47 93 60
P3 2 11 11 4 7 10 9
Ratio test v2 = 76.97*** v2 = 6.13
E: Number of independent directors with corporate governance backgrounds
0 219 302 726 385 356 623 434
1 135 178 277 199 169 277 208
2 28 28 57 49 37 57 40
P3 14 9 7 8 5 8 11
Ratio test v2 = 43.54*** v2 = 3.33
F: Mean number of corporate boards on which independent directors stand
1 110 118 276 181 157 242 176
(1,2] 215 267 563 333 289 510 364
(2,3] 66 118 207 122 114 198 135
>3 5 14 21 5 7 15 18
Ratio test v2 = 15.76* v2 = 5.27
G: Mean compensation of independent directors
<30,000 151 144 331 224 183 308 208
30,000–50,000 163 218 470 243 241 399 291
50,000–100,000 66 134 242 153 126 236 167
>100,000 16 21 24 21 17 22 27
Ratio test v2 = 27.15*** v2 = 5.11
** Represent signiﬁcance levels of 5% respectively.
* Represent signiﬁcance levels of 10% respectively.
*** Represent signiﬁcance levels of 1% respectively.
Y. Song et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 113–132 123estimates. Also, as the percentage of independent directors increases, the percentage of accurate forecasts
increases (accurate forecasts meaning those within 10% of the actual results) and the percentage of overesti-
mated forecasts decreases.
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Fig. 3a. Precision and accuracy of management forecasts and independent directors.
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Fig. 3b(1). Independent directors’ backgrounds and the precision of management forecasts.
124 Y. Song et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 113–132In Fig. 3b(1), the observations concerning boards whose CPA = 1 and those whose CPA = 0 are not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent in their percentage of point estimates. However, the CPA = 1 boards make a higher per-
centage of range estimates than the CPA = 0 boards, resulting in higher forecast precision. The
observations from boards whose LAW = 0 and those whose LAW = 1 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in their
distributions of forecast precision. The observations from boards whose HY_EXP = 0 and those whose
HY_EXP = 1 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in their percentages of qualitative estimates, but the HY_EXP = 1
boards have a higher percentage of point estimates. Similarly, the observations from boards whose
GOV_EXP = 0 and those whose GOV_EXP = 1 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the percentage of point
estimates, but the GOV_EXP = 1 boards have a higher percentage of range estimates. In other words,0%
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Fig. 3b(2). Independent directors’ backgrounds and the accuracy of management forecasts.
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Fig. 3c. Precision and accuracy of management forecasts and the mean number of boards on which independent directors stand.
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Fig. 3d. Precision and accuracy of management forecasts and independent directors’ mean compensation.
Y. Song et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 113–132 125independent directors with industrial expertise or corporate governance expertise seem to have negative eﬀects
on the precision of management forecasts. The results shown in Fig. 3b(2) indicate that the personal attributes
of independent directors have almost no eﬀect on the accuracy of management forecasts.
Fig. 3c shows that as the number of boards that the independent directors serve on increases, their boards’
percentage of quantitative estimates also increases. However, their percentage of point estimates also
decreases, which makes it diﬃcult to judge the eﬀects of director reputation on forecast precision. As for
the accuracy of their management forecasts, boards with independent directors serving on a larger numbersTable 4
Descriptive statistics of continuous variables.
Variable Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std.
A: Forecast precision
EV 0.4748 2.0549*** 0.9087 1.8943 4.5052
ROA 0.0034 0.0228*** 0.0278 0.0647 0.1752
SIZE 6.6922 7.5160*** 7.3983 8.2903 1.3840
B: Forecast bias and error
BIAS 0.0064 0.0007 0.0005 0.0044 0.0306
FE 0.0019 0.0131*** 0.0053 0.0130 0.0277
ROA 0.0076 0.0357*** 0.0346 0.0709 0.1450
UE 0.0226 0.0114*** 0.0145 0.0422 0.1997
|UE| 0.0170 0.0819*** 0.0349 0.0731 0.1825
SIZE 6.7335 7.5597*** 7.4568 8.3421 1.3657
* Represent signiﬁcance levels of 10% respectively.
** Represent signiﬁcance levels of 5% respectively.
*** Represent signiﬁcance levels of 1% respectively.
126 Y. Song et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 113–132of other boards show a decrease in their percentage of overestimated forecasts, but they show no improvement
overall in their percentage of accurate estimates. Fig. 3d indicates that independent directors’ compensation
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the precision or accuracy of management forecasts.
Table 4 reports the descriptive summary of continuous variables. The result for BIAS indicates that there is
no signiﬁcantly optimistic or pessimistic bias in management forecasts. In other words, management forecasts
are mainly unbiased. However, the mean value of FE is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that there are signif-
icant errors in management forecasts.
Table 5 reports the correlation coeﬃcients between the main variables. In the full sample and the sample of
companies with higher ownership balance, the percentage of independent directors has no signiﬁcant correla-Table 5
Correlations between main variables.
Full sample Higher balance Lower balance
Variable Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman
A: Forecast precision (PRECISION)
OUT 0.0172 0.0233 0.0073 0.0033 0.0440* 0.0450*
CPA 0.1360*** 0.1296*** 0.1386*** 0.1282*** 0.1332*** 0.1309***
GOV_EXP 0.0484** 0.0417* 0.0062 0.0094 0.0925*** 0.0924***
LAW 0.0059 0.0077 0.0246 0.0217 0.0376 0.0378
HY_EXP 0.0601*** 0.0765*** 0.0706*** 0.0980*** 0.0492** 0.0570***
REPUT 0.0239 0.0335 0.0287 0.0359* 0.0190 0.0316
COMPEN 0.0051 0.0119 0.0075 0.0177 0.0027 0.0076
|UE| 0.0486** 0.0680*** 0.0683*** 0.0601*** 0.0195 0.0741***
ROA 0.0562*** 0.0685*** 0.0696*** 0.0869*** 0.0384 0.0475**
EV 0.0727*** 0.0680*** 0.0398* 0.0560*** 0.1062*** 0.0765***
MONTH 0.1542*** 0.1354*** 0.1565*** 0.1356*** 0.1519*** 0.1369***
ST 0.0652*** 0.0218 0.0823*** 0.0266 0.0463** 0.0138
SIZE 0.0662*** 0.0808*** 0.0778*** 0.0937*** 0.0542*** 0.0635***
B: Forecast bias (BIAS)
OUT 0.0412* 0.0481** 0.0808*** 0.0566* 0.0122 0.0403
CPA 0.0104 0.0493** 0.0072 0.0318 0.0394 0.0667**
GOV_EXP 0.0013 0.0162 0.0331 0.0167 0.0124 0.0183
LAW 0.0180 0.0169 0.0445 0.0470 0.0210 0.0167
HY_EXP 0.0168 0.0250 0.0135 0.0305 0.0146 0.0181
REPUT 0.0090 0.0177 0.0019 0.0346 0.0294 0.0022
COMPEN 0.0349 0.0320 0.0399 0.0244 0.3614*** 0.0399
UE 0.2488*** 0.4228*** 0.1957*** 0.3875*** 0.3711*** 0.4599***
ROA 0.1096*** 0.3589*** 0.0678** 0.2900*** 0.0849*** 0.4395***
MONTH 0.0835*** 0.0544*** 0.0829*** 0.0263 0.1354*** 0.0859***
ST 0.1617*** 0.0509** 0.1804*** 0.0697** 0.1564*** 0.0298
SIZE 0.1888*** 0.1374*** 0.2093*** 0.1521*** 0.0000 0.1091***
C: Forecast error (FE)
OUT 0.0636*** 0.0208 0.1228*** 0.0231 0.0069 0.0668**
CPA 0.0345 0.0221 0.0405 0.0009 0.0289 0.0441
GOV_EXP 0.0144 0.0087 0.0463 0.0077 0.0257 0.0102
LAW 0.0029 0.0121 0.0351 0.0573* 0.0483 0.0844***
HY_EXP 0.0568*** 0.0094 0.0769*** 0.0160 0.0336 0.0027
REPUT 0.0159 0.0088 0.0233 0.0152 0.0057 0.0334
COMPEN 0.0402* 0.0138 0.0554* 0.0064 0.0225 0.0213
|UE| 0.5123*** 0.3668*** 0.5064*** 0.3746*** 0.5464*** 0.3587***
ROA 0.0284 0.1678*** 0.0958*** 0.1830*** 0.1012*** 0.1521***
MONTH 0.0294 0.0928*** 0.0444 0.0728** 0.0112 0.1128***
ST 0.3056*** 0.1683*** 0.3865*** 0.2450*** 0.2005*** 0.0823***
SIZE 0.2572*** 0.0589*** 0.2962*** 0.0898*** 0.2073*** 0.0304
* Represent signiﬁcance levels of 10% respectively.
** Represent signiﬁcance levels of 5% respectively.
*** Represent signiﬁcance levels of 1% respectively.
Table 6
Ordered-logit results of independent directors’ eﬀects on the precision of management forecasts.
Full sample (N = 2621) Higher balance (N = 1327) Lower balance (N = 1294)
Exp. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OUT + 0.6652 0.6553 0.4146 0.2696 2.2918** 2.0850**
(0.84) (0.81) (0.17) (0.07) (4.59) (3.77)
CPA 0.5335*** 0.5700*** 0.4997***
(47.76) (27.04) (20.24)
GOV_EXP 0.2525*** 0.0789 0.4229***
(10.41) (0.49) (14.31)
LAW 0.0587 0.1687 0.0260
(0.62) (2.53) (0.06)
HY_EXP 0.3150*** 0.4113*** 0.1890*
(16.00) (13.27) (2.85)
REPUT 0.0838 0.0831 0.1045
(1.95) (0.94) (1.47)
COMPEN 0.0776 0.0078 0.1506
(1.04) (0.01) (1.94)
Intercept 3 0.1555 0.3965 0.4021 0.4000 0.2460 0.2050 0.0072 0.8214 0.8588
(0.30) (1.04) (0.99) (0.99) (0.20) (0.12) (0.00) (2.11) (2.19)
Intercept 2 1.7028*** 1.4622*** 1.4986*** 1.6353*** 1.7895*** 1.8837*** 1.7234*** 0.9133 0.9185
(35.21) (14.07) (13.76) (16.34) (10.31) (10.39) (16.45) (2.61) (2.51)
Intercept 1 2.8658*** 2.6256*** 2.6884*** 2.6338*** 2.7879*** 2.9060*** 3.0967*** 2.2907*** 2.3320***
(97.20) (44.79) (43.73) (41.52) (24.75) (24.46) (51.55) (16.19) (15.94)
EV 0.0348*** 0.0351*** 0.0349*** 0.0142 0.0141 0.0174 0.0554*** 0.0555*** 0.0548***
(15.53) (15.75) (15.72) (1.47) (1.44) (2.18) (15.21) (15.26) (14.39)
ROA 0.7721*** 0.7704*** 0.7406*** 0.8603*** 0.8641*** 0.8713*** 0.8419** 0.8625** 0.7728*
(12.36) (12.28) (11.37) (10.41) (10.50) (10.49) (4.35) (4.56) (3.63)
ST 0.5106*** 0.5143*** 0.5201*** 0.5638*** 0.5631*** 0.6326*** 0.4355 0.4523 0.3993
(22.53) (22.81) (22.78) (14.29) (14.25) (17.38) (7.49) (8.05) (6.15)
MONTH 0.4498*** 0.4488*** 0.4682*** 0.5024*** 0.5034*** 0.5202*** 0.4151 0.4145 0.4402
(102.36) (101.83) (108.46) (61.62) (61.76) (64.35) (42.82) (42.64) (47.01)
SIZE 0.1968*** 0.1965*** 0.1815*** 0.1528*** 0.1531*** 0.1433*** 0.2312 0.2314 0.2069
(41.83) (41.68) (32.99) (12.65) (12.68) (10.09) (25.63) (25.64) (19.16)
Industry and year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rescaled R2 (%) 8.77 8.80 11.50 11.64 11.65 14.75 9.96 10.31 13.18
2LogL 6676.03*** 6675.22*** 6602.74*** 3489.45*** 3287.95*** 3244.54*** 3511.44*** 3306.26*** 3267.44***
Wald chi-square statistics in parentheses.
For variables with expected signs, the signiﬁcance level is one-tailed and for other variables the signiﬁcance level is two-tailed.
* Represent signiﬁcance levels of 10% respectively.
** Represent signiﬁcance levels 5% respectively.
*** Represent signiﬁcance levels of 1% respectively.
Y. Song et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 113–132 127tions with precision. However in the case of companies with lower ownership balance, the correlation coeﬃ-
cients between OUT and PRECISION are positive and signiﬁcant at the level of 10%. There is a large gap
between the actual eﬀect of independent directors on the accuracy of management forecasts and the eﬀect
expected by securities regulators. Speciﬁcally, in the full sample and the sample of higher ownership balanced
companies, OUT and BIAS are positively related, indicating that the higher the percentage of independent
directors, the higher the likelihood of overestimated forecasts. Similarly, in the full sample and the sample
of higher ownership balanced companies, the Pearson coeﬃcient between OUT and FE is signiﬁcantly posi-
tive, indicating that the higher the percentage of independent directors, the higher the percentage of forecast
errors. Obviously, these results are in contrast to those expected by security market regulators. However, in
the sample of lower ownership balance companies, the Spearman coeﬃcient between OUT and FE is signif-
icantly negative, indicating that independent directors might play a positive supervisory role in such
companies.
The results indicate that the eﬀects of independent directors’ personal characteristics on the quality of man-
agement forecasts vary from case to case. The precision of management forecasts has a signiﬁcantly positive
Table 7
OLS results of independent directors’ eﬀects on the bias of management forecasts.
Full sample (N = 2225) Higher balance (N = 1131) Lower balance (N = 1094)
Exp. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OUT  0.0225** 0.0226** 0.0541*** 0.0526*** 0.0153 0.0156
(1.85) (1.85) (2.95) (2.85) (0.95) (0.97)
CPA 0.0011 0.0012 0.0009
(0.85) (0.65) (0.51)
GOV_EXP 0.0003 0.0012 0.0012
(0.23) (0.61) (0.68)
LAW 0.0016 0.0040** 0.0005
(1.26) (2.11) (0.33)
HY_EXP 0.0006 0.0013 0.0001
(0.44) (0.67) (0.05)
REPUT 0.0006 0.0009 0.0001
(0.62) (0.62) (0.05)
COMPEN 0.0009 0.0010 0.0005
(0.71) (0.52) (0.28)
UE 0.0539*** 0.0541*** 0.0541*** 0.0404*** 0.0414*** 0.0416*** 0.0832*** 0.0832*** 0.0831***
(12.24) (12.29) (12.24) (6.95) (7.13) (7.13) (11.74) (11.75) (11.67)
ROA 0.0345*** 0.0346*** 0.0344*** 0.0264*** 0.0269*** 0.0271*** 0.0404*** 0.0403*** 0.0400***
(5.68) (5.70) (5.64) (3.24) (3.31) (3.32) (4.03) (4.02) (3.96)
MONTH 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0018** 0.0014 0.0013 0.0013 0.0019** 0.0019** 0.0020**
(2.44) (2.39) (2.46) (1.28) (1.21) (1.24) (2.03) (2.04) (2.09)
ST 0.0119*** 0.0117*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 0.0116*** 0.0117*** 0.0138*** 0.0139*** 0.0141***
(5.76) (5.66) (5.67) (3.85) (3.79) (3.78) (4.88) (4.93) (4.95)
SIZE 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 0.0043*** 0.0042*** 0.0045*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0024***
(6.85) (6.80) (6.85) (5.47) (5.36) (5.49) (3.50) (3.50) (3.33)
Intercept 0.0158*** 0.0075 0.0073 0.0252*** 0.0044 0.0059 0.0044 0.0099 0.0095
(3.27) (1.13) (1.07) (3.42) (0.43) (0.55) (0.68) (1.15) (1.08)
Industry and
year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 (%) 14.02 14.12 14.03 12.20 12.81 12.89 18.39 18.39 18.00
The dependent variable is BIAS.
Student t values in parentheses.
For variables with expected signs, the signiﬁcance level is one-tailed and for other variables, the signiﬁcance level is two-tailed.
* Represent signiﬁcance levels of 10% respectively.
** Represent signiﬁcance levels 5% respectively.
*** Represent signiﬁcance levels of 1% respectively.
128 Y. Song et al./China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 113–132relation with CPA and this correlation is not inﬂuenced by the level of ownership balance. However, incon-
sistent with Wang et al. (2008), the level of forecast precision is negatively correlated with HY_EXP.12 Legal
experts have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the precision of management forecasts and the independent directors who
are experts in corporate governance have negative eﬀects on the precision of management forecasts. Also, the
negative eﬀects are most pronounced in the observations of companies with lower ownership balance.1312 Wang et al. (2008) use a comprehensive index (INDEX = CPA +HY_EXP + LAW). If the positive eﬀect of one factor is much larger
than the negative eﬀect of another factor, the overall eﬀect of the comprehensive index is still positive. In our results, the positive result of
CPA is much larger than the negative result of HY_EXP, so the overall eﬀect of INDEX is of course positive. We argue that the reasons
that industrial experts do not play their expected roles might be (1) that industrial experts are familiar with their industries and might play
a positive role in operational strategy, but they are not ﬁnancial experts and might know little about ﬁnancial analysis; (2) that many
industrial experts are retired and their energy in playing the director’s role may be limited; (3) industrial experts might have closer
relationships with managers and thereby lose their independence.
13 The negative eﬀects of corporate governance experts might be due to their dependence “in substance”. Independent directors who are
mangers of other companies might be controlled by managers of our sample companies and lose their independence. In extreme cases there
may be collusion.
Table 8
OLS results of independent directors’ eﬀects on the accuracy of management forecasts.
Full sample (N = 2225) Higher balance (N = 1131) Lower balance (N = 1094)
Exp. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
OUT  0.0108 0.0105 0.0365*** 0.0344** 0.0133 0.0123
(1.07) (1.04) (2.44) (2.28) (1.00) (0.92)
CPA 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012
(1.28) (0.77) (0.83)
GOV_EXP 0.0006 0.0009 0.0001
(0.52) (0.58) (0.05)
LAW 0.0009 0.0015 0.0036***
(0.89) (0.96) (2.62)
HY_EXP 0.0011 0.0015 0.0003
(0.97) (0.90) (0.19)
REPUT 0.0009 0.0004 0.0020*
(1.13) (0.32) (1.82)
COMPEN 0.0013 0.0016 0.0001
(1.21) (1.01) (0.05)
|UE| 0.0802*** 0.0801*** 0.0802*** 0.0645*** 0.0639*** 0.0641*** 0.1075*** 0.1077*** 0.1082***
(22.89) (22.82) (22.83) (13.55) (13.43) (13.44) (19.28) (19.30) (19.37)
ROA 0.0287*** 0.0287*** 0.0291*** 0.0242*** 0.0242*** 0.0245*** 0.0244*** 0.0245*** 0.0252***
(7.50) (7.50) (7.58) (4.75) (4.76) (4.80) (3.78) (3.80) (3.90)
MONTH 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0019** 0.0019** 0.0019** 0.0018** 0.0018** 0.0018**
(2.94) (2.96) (2.97) (2.16) (2.21) (2.18) (2.21) (2.20) (2.31)
ST 0.0028 0.0028 0.0029 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 0.0094*** 0.0027 0.0026 0.0027
(1.54) (1.51) (1.57) (3.26) (3.27) (3.33) (1.14) (1.08) (1.13)
SIZE 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008* 0.0013** 0.0013* 0.0015** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000
(1.31) (1.30) (1.81) (2.01) (1.95) (2.13) (0.36) (0.36) (0.04)
Intercept 0.0190*** 0.0150*** 0.0154*** 0.0256*** 0.0117 0.0113 0.0108** 0.0155** 0.0158**
(4.65) (2.74) (2.72) (4.18) (1.41) (1.28) (1.97) (2.14) (2.14)
Industry and
year
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 (%) 28.83 28.83 28.87 29.22 29.54 29.38 30.80 30.80 31.13
The dependent variable is FE.
Student t values in parentheses.
For variables with expected signs, the signiﬁcance level is one-tailed and for other variables, the signiﬁcance level is two-tailed.
* Represent signiﬁcance levels of 10% respectively.
** Represent signiﬁcance levels 5% respectively.
*** Represent signiﬁcance levels of 1% respectively.
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and in the sample of companies with lower ownership balance. The negative correlation between COMPEN
and BIAS occurs only in the sample of lower ownership balance companies. The other personal characteristics
have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on BIAS.
For forecast error, the correlations between FE and CPA are in contrasting directions for the two subsam-
ples. Among the observations of lower ownership balance companies, legal experts do increase the accuracy of
management forecasts, but among observations of higher ownership balance companies the presence of legal
experts decreases forecast accuracy.14 Industrial experts have positive eﬀects on forecast accuracy, but these
eﬀects are mainly evident in higher ownership balance companies. The results of COMPEN are similar to
those of HY_EXP.14 This result may be related to legal experts’ judgment of litigation risks. In the case of lower ownership balance, the likelihood of
irregularities in information disclosure might be higher (Wang et al., 2008) and this could increase litigation risk. Legal experts might try to
decrease their litigation risk through eﬀorts to improve the quality of information disclosure. In the cases of higher ownership balance,
litigation risks are lower. Legal experts might then do nothing or even take advantage of gaps in the laws and regulations, thus reducing
the quality of information disclosure.
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The results of regressions on forecast precision are reported in Table 6. Only in the lower ownership
balance sample are the estimated coeﬃcients on OUT signiﬁcantly positive, which is consistent with the
descriptive statistics. The estimated coeﬃcients on CPA are signiﬁcantly positive in all regressions, but
those on HY_EXP are all signiﬁcantly negative. In other words, after controlling for other factors that
might determine the precision of management forecasts, the eﬀects of CPA and HY_EXP are still
signiﬁcant.
Table 7 reports the OLS results of forecast bias. For the full sample and the subsample of higher
ownership balance, the coeﬃcients on OUT are both signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that the likelihood
of overestimated forecasts increases as the percentage of independent directors increases. These results
indicate that independent directors might play negative roles instead of the expected positive ﬁduciary
roles.
The regressions on FE are reported in Table 8. The results indicate that inconsistent with the expectations
of securities regulators, independent directors play negative roles in situations of higher ownership balance. In
addition, the coeﬃcients on CPA are all negative, although they are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
4.4. Robustness tests
In the above analysis, CPA, LAW, HY_EXP and GOV_EXP are all dummy variables. In a robustness test,
we deﬁne them as the number of corresponding independent directors. The results from using these continu-
ous variables are consistent with the reported results.
The observations of management forecasts were classiﬁed into four types, each with a diﬀerent numerical
level of precision. In a robustness test, we classify them into two types, either as qualitative estimates or quan-
titative estimates. The unreported results are consistent with previous ﬁndings.
The index of ownership balance that we use has no consideration of shareholders other than the largest ﬁve
shareholders. In a robustness test, we consider the second to tenth largest shareholders. The unreported results
are consistent with previous ﬁndings.
When analyzing the accuracy of management forecasts, the sample includes open-interval estimates.
In a robustness test, we exclude open-interval estimates and use only range estimates and point esti-
mates. The ﬁnal sample consists of 1708 observations, with 839 of these observations concerning com-
panies with lower ownership balance. We re-run the regressions and the unreported results are
qualitatively the same.
5. Conclusions
Management forecasts are an important part of listed ﬁrm’s information disclosure (Bai, 2009) and
independent directors should play key supervisory roles in improving the quality of such forecasts (Wang
et al., 2008). Therefore, we might expect that the increased presence of independent directors should
improve the quality of management forecasts. Our results indicate that in the case of companies with
lower ownership balance, independent directors do improve the precision of management forecasts, but
they have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the bias or error of management forecasts. In the case of companies
with higher ownership balance, independent directors tend to have negative eﬀects on the quality of man-
agement forecasts.
The results suggest that the eﬀects of independent directors’ expertise are varied. Independent directors who
are also CPAs can signiﬁcantly improve the precision of management forecasts, but they have no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the accuracy of the forecasts. Independent directors with industrial or corporate governance
backgrounds commonly have a negative eﬀect on the precision of management forecasts. Independent direc-
tors with legal backgrounds have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the precision of management forecasts, but they
improve forecast accuracy in the case of companies with lower balance ownership.
Overall, the supervisory eﬃciency of independent directors is relatively low. The expertise and skills of inde-
pendent directors make little diﬀerence to the quality of management forecasts.
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